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CASENOTES
CONSTITUTIONAL LAW: IS THE NCAA ELIGIBLE FOR
A NEW INTERPRETATION OF STATE ACTION?
Chaim Arlosoroff ("Arlosoroff") was playing the number one sin-
gles position for the Duke University ("Duke") tennis team when the
National Collegiate Athletic Association ("NCAA") cut his collegiate
career short. The NCAA told Duke that Arlosoroff violated one of the
NCAA's many eligibility rules, and that continued participation by
Arlosoroff would result in sanctions against the school.
Arlosoroff, an Israeli citizen, had served several years in Israel's
army,' after which he participated for two and one-half years in many
amateur tennis tournaments and on Israel's Davis Cup team. He subse-
quently enrolled at Duke and played the number one singles position on
the tennis team in his freshman year. After the year was over, however,
the NCAA declared Arlosoroff ineligible from further competition based
on one of its eligibility rules.2
The rule provided that any participation in "organized competition
in a sport during each twelve-month period after the student's twentieth
birthday and prior to matriculation with a member institution should
count as one year of varsity competition in that sport."3 Additionally,
NCAA rules limit participation in varsity competition to four years.4
Arlosoroff did not begin to participate in tennis tournaments until he was
age twenty-two, 5 when he participated for two and one-half years on
Israel's Davis Cup team. Since Arlosoroff's participation in amateur ten-
nis spanned three different "twelve-month periods," the NCAA ruled
that his freshman year was the fourth and final year of his eligibility for
collegiate competition.6 Consequently, Duke prohibited Arlosoroff from
playing due to the NCAA's threatened sanctions.7
1. All Israeli young men must serve in the army. The time spent in the army caused
Arlosoroff to be subject to the NCAA rule in question, since it delayed his entry into collegiate
competition until after his twentieth birthday. Arlosoroff v. National Collegiate Athletic
Ass'n, 746 F.2d 1019, 1020 (4th Cir. 1984).
2. Id.
3. NCAA Bylaw 5-1-(d)-(3) (1980).
4. NCAA CONST. art. III.
5. See supra note I and accompanying text.
6. Arlosoroff, 746 F.2d at 1020.
7. Some of the NCAA's prior sanctions have been to reduce the number of scholarships
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Arlosoroff commenced suit against both Duke and the NCAA in a
North Carolina state court. He alleged a denial of due process and equal
protection under the United States Constitution and sought to enjoin the
defendants from enforcing the rule.8 The state court granted a tempo-
rary restraining order, which allowed Arlosoroff to participate on Duke's
tennis team pending resolution of the case, but Duke and the NCAA
promptly removed the case to federal court.9 The district judge granted
a preliminary injunction and the NCAA appealed.' °
In Arlosoroff v. National Collegiate Athletic Association," the Fourth
Circuit Court of Appeals reversed the district court and held that the
Equal Protection and Due Process clauses of the Fourteenth Amend-
ment 2 were inapplicable because adoption of the rule by the NCAA was
private conduct and not state action.1
3
To reach this result, the appellate court had to interpret the defend-
ants' actions in light of the Fourteenth Amendment, which provides:
No State shall make or enforce any law which shall abridge
the privileges or immunities of citizens of the United States; nor
shall any State deprive any person of life, liberty, or property,
without due process of law; nor deny to any person within its
jurisdiction the equal protection of the laws. 4
As the phrase "No State shall" indicates, the Fourteenth Amendment
applies only to acts of the state, not to the acts of private persons or
available to a member institution, or to take away Bowl games, nonconference games, televi-
sion rights and revenues, students' free ticket privileges, and, recently, the NCAA eliminated
all of a school's football games for an entire season. L.A. Times, Feb. 26, 1987, Pt. III, at 1,
col. 4.
8. Arlosoroff, 746 F.2d at 1020. Arlosoroff's equal protection claim was based upon an
allegation that the challenged Bylaw was designed to exclude aliens from competition. Id.
The due process claim was founded upon the fact that the Bylaw was being applied to
Arlosoroff's playing in Israel, which occurred before the challenged Bylaw became effective.
Id. at 1020 n.3. Arlosoroff was attempting to secure his participation on Duke's tennis team
for three more years. Typically, the best players on a collegiate athletic team are given schol-
arships, so presumably Arlosoroff was also attempting to have his education funded by Duke
for the next three years.
9. Id. The allegation of denial of due process and equal protection would be sufficient to
raise a federal question, invoking the jurisdiction of the federal courts, pursuant to 28 U.S.C.
§ 1331 (1982) and thereby permitting removal from state to federal court per 28 U.S.C.
§ 1441(a) (1982).
10. Arlosoroff, 746 F.2d at 1020.
11. 746 F.2d 1019 (4th Cir. 1984).
12. U.S. CONST. amend. XIV.
13. Arlosoroff, 746 F.2d at 1022. The pertinent rule was NCAA Bylaw 5-1-(d)-(3). See
supra note 3 and accompanying text.
14. U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § I (emphasis added).
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entities. 5 Thus, the court had to decide whether the NCAA's acts were
"acts of the state."
To aid its decision, the court first examined the defendant's status.
The NCAA is a voluntary association of almost one thousand four-year
colleges and universities. It conducts annual conventions to promulgate
rules on minimum standards for scholarship, sportsmanship and ama-
teurism for its member institutions to follow. The member institutions,
of which about half are state and federal public institutions, are all repre-
sented at these conventions. The challenged eligibility rule was adopted
by a majority vote of member institutions at one such convention. 6
The Arlosoroff court then looked to existing case law, discovering a
number of cases, none in the Fourth Circuit, which had held the NCAA
to be a state actor."7 The court stated that the holdings in those cases
were based on "the notion that indirect involvement of state governments
could convert what otherwise would be considered private conduct into
state action." 8 However, the Arlosoroff court stated that the Supreme
Court had recently rejected that notion, 9 and, therefore, reasoned that
the earlier NCAA cases would now require the opposite conclusion.2 °
The appellate court noted that no precise formula existed to deter-
mine when otherwise private conduct was state action. 2' Rather, the in-
quiry in each case was whether the conduct is "fairly attributable to the
state."' 22 In Arlosoroff, the NCAA's conduct was held not to be fairly
attributable to the state for two reasons. First, neither the act of disquali-
fying a college athlete's participation, nor the NCAA's regulation of in-
tercollegiate athletics was a "function traditionally exclusively reserved
to the state."' 23 Second, the NCAA was formally a private entity and a
15. See Civil Rights Cases, 109 U.S. 3, 11 (1883); Shelley v. Kraemer, 334 U.S. 1, 13
(1948).
16. Arlosoroff, 746 F.2d at 1020. The rule was adopted at the January 1980 convention.
Id.
17. Id. at 1021 (citing Regents of the Univ. of Minn. v. NCAA, 560 F.2d 352 (8th Cir.
1977); Howard Univ. v. NCAA, 510 F.2d 213 (D.C. Cir. 1975); Parish v. NCAA, 506 F.2d
1028 (5th Cir. 1975); Associated Students, Inc. v. NCAA, 493 F.2d 1251 (9th Cir. 1974)).
18. Arlosoroff, 746 F.2d at 1021. The court cited no authority for this premise.
19. In Blum v. Yaretsky, 457 U.S. 991 (1982), the Court held that "a State normally can
be held responsible for a private decision only when it has exercised coercive power or has
provided such significant encouragement, either overt or covert, that the choice must in law be
deemed to be that of the State." Id. at 1004. See also Rendell-Baker v. Kohn, 457 U.S. 830,
840 (1982).
20. Arlosoroff, 746 F.2d at 1021.
21. Id.
22. Id. (citing Lugar v. Edmondson Oil Co., 457 U.S. 922, 937 (1982)).
23. Arlosoroff, 746 F.2d at 1021 (citing Jackson v. Metropolitan Edison Co., 419 U.S. 345,
352 (1975)).
1987]
LOYOLA ENTER TAINMENT LAW JOURNAL
voluntary association of public and private institutions.24
The Arlosoroff court reasoned that, even though more than half of
the NCAA's revenues came from public institutions, the public institu-
tions alone did not cause the challenged rule to be passed. Thus,
Arlosoroff's exclusion from competition at Duke was not pursuant to a
state rule of conduct.2" The court held that it was not enough that an
institution be highly regulated and subsidized by a state. The state, in its
regulatory or subsidizing function, must have ordered or caused the ac-
tion complained of for state action to exist.26 Arlosoroff had not made a
sufficient showing that the state institutions dictated the result in his
case, so the NCAA's adoption of the rule was held to be private
conduct.27
The implications of Arlosoroff are very disturbing. The decision al-
lows the NCAA to promulgate virtually whatever rules it desires, be-
cause most of the Constitution's guarantees of individual rights shield
individuals only from government action.28 For example, the member
institutions recently voted to require random drug testing of all ath-
letes.29 The athletes now have no recourse to argue before the judiciary
that this rule violates either their Fourteenth Amendment right to due
process or their Fourth Amendment right to be free from unreasonable
searches.3 Their remaining alternatives would be to submit to (and
pass) the test, play for a school not governed by the NCAA, or not par-
ticipate at all in their sport.31
Making matters worse, since the NCAA sponsors virtually all col-
legiate athletic events,32 an athlete really has only two alternatives.33 In
24. Arlosoroff, 746 F.2d at 1021.
25. Id. at 1022.
26. Id. (citing Rendell-Baker, 457 U.S. at 840, and Blum, 457 U.S. at 1004).
27. Arlosoroff 746 F.2d at 1022.
28. In addition to the Fourteenth Amendment, the individual guarantees protected from
government conduct are found in Article I §§ 9 and 10 of the body of the Constitution, most of
the first eight amendments as incorporated through the Fourteenth Amendment, and the Fif-
teenth, Nineteenth, Twenty-Fourth, and Twenty-Sixth Amendments. L. TRIBE, AMERICAN
CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 1147 n.l (1978).
29. Selcraig, The NCAA Goes After Drugs, SPORTS ILLUSTRATED, Oct. 6, 1986, at 75.
30. Several courts have held random urine tests to be unconstitutional. See, e.g., McDon-
ell v. Hunter, 612 F. Supp. 1122, 1130 (S.D. Iowa 1985); Shoemaker v. Handel, 619 F. Supp.
1089, 1098 (D.N.J. 1985). See generally Note, Your Urine or Your Job: Is Private Employee
Drug Urinalysis Constitutional in California?, 19 Loy. L.A.L. REV. 1451 (1986).
31. This new policy kept Oklahoma University's All-American linebacker Brian Bosworth
out of his team's Orange Bowl game on January 1, 1987, because he tested positive for steroids.
Bosworth admitted taking the drug, which is not illegal, nine months prior to the drug test.
L.A. Times, Dec. 26, 1986, Pt. III, at 15, col. 1.
32. Associated Students, 493 F.2d at 1253.
33. The NCAA's status as a near monopoly is not in itself sufficient to give rise to state
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the drug testing example above, the student athlete must either submit or
not play. One can envision other examples where the NCAA could enact
purely discriminatory rules which bar certain athletes from participating
in sports altogether. a4 The athlete would have no recourse from such
rules. The Arlosoroff decision, then, gives the NCAA substantial practi-
cal control over thousands of young student-athletes' collegiate careers.
Interestingly, in the earlier cases which held the NCAA to be a state
actor, the courts still found the NCAA rule to be constitutional.35 In so
doing, those courts avoided the ramifications presented by the Arlosoroff
decision, and yet they reached a similar result; the NCAA was allowed to
enforce its rules. A finding of state action, then, would be a "safer" ap-
proach because it would allow the judiciary to monitor the NCAA.
The development of the concept of state action versus private con-
duct has had a quite confusing history. Situations arose where justice
required that private entities be considered state actors, and a plethora of
rules developed to determine just who was or was not a state actor. De-
spite the precedents, as of 1978 the Supreme Court had not succeeded in
developing a state action "doctrine," a coherent set of rules for determin-
ing whether private actors were responsible for an asserted constitutional
violation. 36 However, earlier Court decisions primarily followed two the-
ories to determine when a private entity became a state actor. One the-
ory applied a "public function" analysis and the other examined the
"nexus" between the state and private actor.3 7 A recent decision of the
action. See Moose Lodge No. 107 v. Irvis, 407 U.S. 163, 177 (1972) and Jackson, 419 U.S. at
351-52.
34. For example, the NCAA could create a rule which allowed no foreign students to
participate in athletic competition. This result would have to stand even though a similar rule
was held unconstitutional. See Howard Univ., 510 F.2d at 222. Also, the NCAA's enforce-
ment branch could entrap students it did not like in order to forbid them from playing. "[I]n
1978, a 17-member U.S. House Subcommittee on Oversight and Investigations was also highly
critical of the NCAA's investigative and enforcement tactics, particularly as they pertained to
due process." McCallum, In the Kingdom of the Solitary Man, SPORTS ILLUSTRATED, Oct. 6,
1986, at 77.
35. Regents of the Univ. of Minn. v. NCAA, 560 F.2d 352, 372 (8th Cir. 1977) (NCAA
Bylaws 3-1-(a)-(3), 3 -1-(g)-( 6 ) and 3-4-(a), which involved impermissible payments to stu-
dents); Howard Univ. v. NCAA, 510 F.2d 213, 222 (D.C. Cir. 1975) (NCAA CONST. art. III
§ 9(a), NCAA Bylaws 4-l-(f)-(2) and 4-6-(b)-(1), which involved a maximum eligibility period
and a minimum required grade point average); Parish v. NCAA, 506 F.2d 1028, 1034 (5th Cir.
1975) (NCAA Bylaw 4-6-(b)-(1), which involved a minimum required grade point average);
Associated Students, Inc. v. NCAA, 493 F.2d 1251, 1256 (9th Cir. 1974) (NCAA Bylaw 4-6-
(b)-(1), which involved a minimum required grade point average).
36. L. TRIBE, supra note 28 at 1148-49. The Supreme Court itself had noted that there
was no "test" of state action. See, e.g., Burton v. Wilmington Parking Auth., 365 U.S. 715,
722 (1961); Reitman v. Mulkey, 387 U.S. 369, 378 (1967).
37. G. GUNTHER, CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 866-67 (1 1th Ed. 1985).
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Court has outlined a new test which may provide the elusive doctrine. 38
The public function theory, which got its start in 1944 in a series of
decisions which have been labeled the White Primary Cases, was signifi-
cantly narrowed in scope after Chief Justice Burger joined the Court in
1969. The public function would now be required to be "traditionally
exclusively reserved to the State."' 39 With this new standard, the Court
held that a privately owned utility, licensed and regulated by the state,
was not performing a public function.' In addition, a warehouseman's
sale of stored goods pursuant to a state granted lien was held not to be a
public function.4' More recently, the Court held in companion cases that
neither the operation of a private nursing home nor the operation of a
private school was exclusively reserved to the state.42
Unfortunately, despite the Court's narrow definition of a public
function, the cases are still troublesome because "[n]o satisfactory crite-
38. Lugar, 457 U.S. at 939. See discussion infra notes 55-61 and accompanying text.
39. Jackson v. Metropolitan Edison Co., 419 U.S. 345, 352 (1974). The first White Pri-
mary case held that running a primary election was a government function. Smith v. All-
wright, 321 U.S. 649, 664 (1944). Later, that rule was extended to cover even pre-primary
elections in Terry v. Adams, 345 U.S. 461 (1953). The rule to be drawn from these cases was
summarized "when a state structures its electoral apparatus in a form which devolves upon a
political organization the uncontested choice of public officials, that organization itself, in
whatever disguise, takes on those attributes of government which draws the Constitution's
safeguards into play." Id. at 484 (Clark, J., concurring). The reasoning behind the rule was
that state law made primary elections an integral part of the electoral scheme and primary
election management was the responsibility of the political parties, so the political parties per-
formed a "state function," thereby subjecting themselves to constitutional limitations. Smith,
321 U.S. at 663-64.
The public function theory was used in 1946 to find that a private company which owned
and operated a town outside of Mobile, Alabama, performed a public function. Marsh v.
Alabama, 326 U.S. 501 (1946). There, the finding of state action gave a Jehovah's Witness the
right to distribute religious literature under the free press and religion clauses of the Constitu-
tion. Id. at 509. Finally, twenty years later, operation of a park was held to render services
which were "powers or functions governmental in nature." Evans v. Newton, 382 U.S. 296,
299 (1966) (private trustees of a city-owned park, once found to be state actors, could not
discriminate against non-whites as provided in the trust).
40. Jackson, 419 U.S. at 358-59. This result allowed the company to shut off power to a
person's home without having to provide any of the traditional due process protections such as
notice, hearing, counsel and impartial judgment.
41. Flagg Bros., Inc. v. Brooks, 436 U.S. 149 (1978). The plaintiff contended that dispute
resolution via a state-created lien was a public function. The Court responded that private
disputes are settled in many different ways without government intervention. Id. at 163. Like-
wise, the operation of a shopping center was not a public function, so union members could be
prevented from picketing at a mall. Hudgens v. NLRB, 424 U.S. 507 (1976).
42. Blum, 457 U.S. at 1005 and Rendell-Baker, 457 U.S. at 840, respectively. The private
entities were thus free to discharge patients or fire employees, despite various state regulations
which governed their operations. The state's response to the private entity's decisions did not
render it responsible for those actions. Blum, 457 U.S. at 1005.
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ria exist to determine what is or is not inherently governmental .... ,,.3
None of the Burger Court "public function" cases has held the private
entity to be a state actor. The Court has not indicated which functions
will fit the narrow definition of "traditionally exclusively reserved to the
state." It has said, though, that "education, fire and police protection,
and tax collection" have a large degree of exclusivity, but the Court was
unwilling to say that the government had complete exclusivity over those
functions." Thus, under the public function cases, it remains unclear
what is exclusively governmental and who would be considered to be
performing a public function.
The nexus theory is similarly problematic. The relevant inquiry
here, though, is not what is inherently governmental, but rather what
connection with the government is considered sufficient. The Court's
analysis of earlier nexus cases has been divided into roughly four
branches: (1) encouragement, (2) commandment, (3) symbiotic relation-
ship, and (4) concerted action or entanglement.4 5
The "encouragement" branch will convert a private actor into a
state actor if the state encouraged the private actor. The Court found
sufficient encouragement to give rise to state action when California vot-
ers amended their Constitution to prohibit the government from interfer-
ing with private discrimination in the sale or lease of real estate.46 The
Court struck down the amendment because it would encourage and in-
volve the state in racial discrimination.47
Since a finding of state encouragement is sufficient in itself to con-
vert a private entity into a state actor, it logically follows that in the
"commandment" branch, where the state commands the conduct, pri-
vate actions would become state conduct. Even indirect commandments
by the state can give rise to state action. Thus, where the judiciary was
called upon to enforce a private, racially restrictive covenant, the Court
held that, even though it applied neutral laws, such judicial enforcement
could be construed as a commandment by the state to discriminate, and
was therefore state action. 8
43. L. TRIBE, supra note 28, at 1163. To support this proposition, Professor Tribe com-
pares Jackson (providing electrical service was not a public function) with Evans (providing a
public park was a public function). Id. at 1163 n.3.
44. Flagg Brosi, 436 U.S. at 163. But cf Rendell-Baker, 457 U.S at 840 (holding that
operation of a private school was not traditionally exclusively reserved to the state).
45. See Rendell-Baker, 457 U.S. at 840-42.
46. See Reitman v. Mulkey, 387 U.S. 369 (1967).
47. Id. at 381. See also Hunter v. Erickson, 393 U.S. 385 (1969) (striking down a provi-
sion which required all fair housing legislation to be submitted for referendum prior to adop-
tion because this would encourage discrimination).
48. Shelley v. Kraemer, 334 U.S. 1, 19 (1948). The Court reasoned that but for judicial
1987]
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The "symbiotic relationship" branch finds state action when the
government enters into a symbiotic, i.e. mutually beneficial, relationship
with a private entity. The Court found such a relationship to exist where
a state parking agency leased out space for a privately owned restaurant
within the public building, and the restaurant refused to serve blacks.49
The Court reasoned that the restaurant was essential to successful opera-
tion of the public parking facility due to the rents received, and the res-
taurant's success depended on its ability to discriminate in order to
attract customers.50 However, no symbiotic relationship was found in
the operation of a privately owned nursing home despite state licensing
and subsidy of the nursing home, which cared for patients that otherwise
might go to public hospitals.51
The "concerted action" branch of the nexus theory considers the
state's entanglement with the private entity, even though the state does
not benefit from or encourage the private action. Joint participation by
state officials with a private party in a challenged prejudgment attach-
ment proceeding was sufficient state involvement to give rise to state ac-
tion.52 However, state licensing of a private entity was held not sufficient
to make the entity's private conduct into state action.53 Likewise, sub-
stantial state funding does not show concerted action which would con-
vert private conduct into state action.
54
The Supreme Court in Lugar v. Edmondson Oil Co.55 recently at-
tempted to define (or perhaps redefine) the test for state action. The new
standard uses a two-part approach. First, "the party charged with the
deprivation must be a person who may fairly be said to be a state actor
... [either] because he is a state official, because he has acted together
with or has obtained significant aid from state officials, or because his
conduct is otherwise chargeable to the State." 56 Second, "the depriva-
intervention there would be no discrimination because the seller was willing to transfer owner-
ship to a buyer who was subject to the covenant. Id.
49. Burton v. Wilmington Parking Auth., 365 U.S. 715, 724-25 (1961).
50. Id. at 723. "It was also relevant that the restaurant was visually indistinguishable
from a public entity." L. TRIBE, supra note 28 at 1160 n.13.
51. Blum, 457 U.S. at 1011. See supra note 19 and accompanying text.
52. Adickes v. S.H. Kress & Co., 398 U.S. 144 (1970). In Adickes, a private party partici-
pated with a state official in a conspiracy to discriminate against the plaintiff on the basis of his
race. The Court held that joint participation with the state yielded state action. Id. at 152.
53. Moose Lodge No. 107 v. Irvis, 407 U.S. 163 (1972) (holding a private club could
discriminate in its service even when only a limited number of liquor licenses were given out).
See also Jackson, 419 U.S. 345 and Blum, 457 U.S. 991.
54. Rendell-Baker, 457 U.S. at 840. The NCAA was substantially funded through state
institution dollars. See supra note 25 and accompanying text.
55. 457 U.S. 922 (1982).
56. Id. at 937.
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tion must be caused by the exercise of some right or privilege created by
the State or by a rule of conduct imposed by the State or by a person for
whom the State is responsible." 57
The first part of the test requires that the private entity be a state
actor. The Lugar Court's examples of a "state actor" were "public func-
tion," "compulsion [commandment]," "nexus [symbiotic relationship],"
or "joint [concerted] action,"58 all of which were among the traditional
tests for state actor referenced above. The examples given by the Court
left out the "encouragement" branch of the nexus theory. The Court did
not say that this branch would no longer convert a private entity into a
state actor. In fact, the "obtained significant aid from state officials" lan-
guage i 1 n the test indicates that the "encouragement" branch continues
to be an acceptable test for state actor.
The second part of the test poses the additional requirement that the
deprivation must be caused by the exercise of a state rule of conduct.
The example given of this was the Flagg Brothers case which involved a
warehouseman's sale pursuant to a state granted lien.59 The state statute
giving the power to consummate the sale satisfied the second part of the
test, but no state action was found because the private entity's acts were
not attributable to the state. 6° Another example, exhibiting the opposite
conclusion, would be a public defender's decision on how to handle a
case. The Court in such a case held that there was no state action despite
the public defender's status as a state official, because the lawyer acted
pursuant to the American Bar Association's Code of Professional Con-
duct, which was not a state rule of conduct or a "privilege created by the
state. "61
Given the varied means to find state action, the court could easily
have found state action here. It could have followed prior case law, used
a more appropriate test, or even applied some completely different stan-
dard. The easiest way to find state action would be to follow the earlier
NCAA cases.62 Although not binding, those cases did offer several ways
to find state action. The A rlosoroff court, however, summarily dismissed
them by a two-step reasoning process: (1) the earlier cases rested on the
notion that indirect involvement of a state government could convert pri-
57. Id.
58. Id. at 939. Though the court referred to one of the examples as the "nexus" test, it
cited Burton, 365 U.S. 715 (1961), as authority. The test there has traditionally been referred
to as the "symbiotic relationship" test. See supra notes 49-50 and accompanying text.
59. 436 U.S. 149 (1978). See supra note 41 for a discussion of the holding in this case.
60. Lugar, 457 U.S. at 938-39 (citing Flagg Bros., 436 U.S. at 157).
61. Polk County v. Dodson, 454 U.S. 312, 324-25 (1981).
62. See supra note 17.
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vate conduct into state action;63 and, (2) that notion was rejected by the
Supreme Court.64
Both elements of the Arlosoroff court's reasoning are flawed. First,
the court did not say what it meant by indirect, but some of the earlier
NCAA cases rested on the public function theory, which need not in-
volve any government action. In Parish v. NCAA ,65 for example, the
court noted that organized athletics play a large role in higher education
and, further, meaningful regulation of this aspect of education is beyond
the reach of any one state.66 Thus, the court held that the NCAA was
"performing a traditional governmental function," because it took upon
itself the role of coordinating and overseeing college athletics.67 Further,
in another case, the Supreme Court stated that education has a high de-
gree of exclusivity. 6 Thus, the Parish holding fits the new narrow stan-
dard for public function enunciated by the Supreme Court.69
Additionally, some of the earlier NCAA cases which found state
action rested partly on the concerted action theory, which requires direct
action on the part of the government, not indirect involvement. In Asso-
ciated Students, Inc. v. NCAA/, 7 ° for example, the court examined the
entanglement between the NCAA and the public schools (which were
state agencies). It stated that the NCAA does control public schools'
athletic programs, state funds are used to pay membership dues, and the
NCAA enforces the rules which are enacted by its members, at least half
of which are public institutions.72 Duke's control over athletic programs,
together with the NCAA's enforcement of rules, operated to deprive
Arlosoroff of his opportunity to play collegiate tennis.
Second, the Supreme Court cases did not reject the notion that indi-
rect state involvement could never convert private conduct into state ac-
63. See, e.g., Howard Univ., 510 F.2d at 217. "[T]he government's involvement need not
be either exclusive or direct; governmental action may be found even though the government's
participation 'was peripheral .... Id. (citing United States v. Guest, 383 U.S. 745, 755-56
(1966)).
64. Arlosoroff, 746 F.2d at 1021 (citing Rendell-Baker v. Kohn, 457 U.S. 830 (1982) and
Blum v. Yaretsky, 457 U.S. 991 (1982)).
65. 506 F.2d 1028 (5th Cir. 1975).
66. Id. at 1032. Another traditional governmental function is that of protecting health
and safety. The NCAA grew out of a meeting to agree on some rules to try to cut down on the
number of football players being killed. L.A. Times, Jan. 11, 1987, Pt. III, at 14, col. 4.
67. Parish, 506 F.2d at 1032-33.
68. Flagg Bros., 436 U.S. at 163. The Court, though, was unwilling to characterize it as
complete exclusivity. Id.
69. See supra note 39 and accompanying text.
70. 493 F.2d 1251 (9th Cir. 1974).
71. Id. at 1254-55 (adopting the court's analysis in Parish, 361 F. Supp. at 1219).
72. Associated Students, 493 F.2d at 1254-55.
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tion. Those cases, Rendell-Baker v. Kohn and Blum v. Yaretsky, merely
held that substantial state financial support and close government regula-
tion were not sufficient involvement to give rise to state action.73 Even
though financial and regulatory involvement are forms of indirect in-
volvement, in neither case did the Supreme Court specifically say that
indirect involvement would always be insufficient to convert private con-
duct to state action.
For example, one form of indirect action the Arlosoroff court should
have considered was that the state (through its institutions) had a
"symbiotic relationship" with the NCAA.74 The Court in Lugar explic-
itly recognized the viability of this branch." Plus, one of the prior
NCAA cases, Howard University v. NCAA, 76 relied on that theory.
There, the court established interdependence by the state institutions'
need for an agency to regulate and supervise intercollegiate athletics and
the NCAA's need for both members and funds. Each entity aided the
other by supplying its needs, thus creating a dependency by each on the
other. Filling these needs gave rise to a mutually beneficial relation-
ship.77 Hence, the Arlosoroff court missed the mark in summarily re-
jecting the earlier cases which found the NCAA to be a state actor.
Even after the court summarily dismissed the prior NCAA cases, it
could still have found state action by applying an appropriate test. The
court has great latitude in setting up the test for state action. The
Arlosoroff court itself acknowledged that "[t]here is no precise
formula,",7 ' but that the test was whether the conduct is "fairly attributa-
ble to the state.",79 Thus, the question becomes: what is "fairly attributa-
ble"? The Arlosoroff court declared that a high degree of regulation and
subsidy by a state was not enough. 80 Rather, they stated the test for
"fairly attributable" was: (1) the state in its regulatory or subsidizing
function must order or cause the action complained of; or, (2) the func-
tion must be one traditionally reserved to the state.8 1 The court cited no
authority for this test. The test, however, closely parallels the two histor-
ical theories (nexus and public function) for finding state action.
73. Blum, 457 U.S. at 1004-05; Rendell-Baker, 457 U.S. at 840-41.
74. When the state and a private entity have a substantial interdependence, state action
may result with each being responsible for the other's acts.
75. See supra note 58 and accompanying text.
76. 510 F.2d 213 (D.C. Cir. 1975).
77. Id. at 220. The court also noted that the NCAA negotiated $13,000,000 in television
contracts, which went "primarily to the public institutions." Id.
78. Arlosoroff, 746 F.2d at 1021.
79. Id. (citing Lugar, 457 U.S. at 937).
80. Arlosoroff, 746 F.2d at 1022.
81. Id.
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Recall, though, that the problem lay in giving substance to the test.
In attempting to give substance to the test, the Arlosoroff court stated
"extensively regulated and highly subsidized by the state" was not
enough to create state action, where the state's involvement did not cause
the challenged act.82 The NCAA was likened to the Rendell-Baker and
Blum cases because, despite the states' substantial involvement, there was
''no suggestion ... the state institutions joined together to vote as a bloc
to effect adoption of the Bylaw over the objection of private institu-
tions. '"" Such a motivation would be very hard to prove for any entity
composed of both public and private members. Thus, the larger entity
would be free from constitutional restrictions.
The court, in order to protect the student-athletes, could have found
some middle ground between the "highly regulated and subsidized" test
which it rejected as insufficient involvement, and the "ordered or caused"
test which it actually used. For example, the court could have devised a
test which required the defendant to be "highly regulated and influenced
by the state in causing the act complained of." 4
The NCAA would have met this more appropriate test for state ac-
tor because of the public institutions' substantial influence over the
NCAA. The public institutions comprise about half the NCAA's mem-
bership and contribute more than half of the NCAA's revenues. Addi-
tionally, the member public institutions are a dominant force in
determining NCAA policy and in dictating NCAA actions because they
have traditionally provided the majority of members on the governing
council and the various committees, who wield most of the power in the
NCAA.85
Alternatively, the Arlosoroff court could have followed the two-part
test for "fair attribution" set out in the Lugar case. The first part re-
quires the party charged with the deprivation be fairly said to be a state
actor.8 6 As noted earlier, the NCAA could be said to be a state actor
under the public function,8 7 concerted action,88 or symbiotic relation-
82. Id. The court cited Rendell-Baker, 457 U.S. at 840, and Blum, 457 U.S. at 1004 for
this proposition. Similarly, the autonomous decisions of a public official were not caused by
the state. Arlosoroff, 746 F.2d at 1022 (citing Polk County v. Dodson, 454 U.S. 312, 318
(1981)).
83. Arlosoroff, 746 F.2d at 1022.
84. The Court in Rendell-Baker held that a state can be responsible for a private decision
when it has provided such significant encouragement that the choice must be deemed to be
that of the State. 457 U.S. at 940. See also Blum, 457 U.S. at 1004.
85. Howard Univ., 510 F.2d at 219. See also Parish, 506 F.2d at 1032.
86. Lugar v. Edmondson Oil Co., 457 U.S. 922, 937 (1982).
87. See supra notes 65-69 and accompanying text.
88. See supra notes 70-72 and accompanying text.
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ship89 theories. Thus, the NCAA could fairly be said to be a state actor
in satisfaction of the first part of the test.
The second part requires that the deprivation be "caused by the ex-
ercise of some right or privilege created by the State or by a rule of con-
duct imposed by the State or by a person for whom the State is
responsible."9 The NCAA would satisfy this requirement in either of
two ways. Primarily, Arlosoroff's deprivation was caused by a "rule of
conduct imposed by a person for whom the State is responsible." Here,
the states are responsible for the acts of their institutions. These institu-
tions, which make up a substantial part of the NCAA, enacted the rule
which prohibited Arlosoroff from playing. Thus, the rule of conduct was
imposed by the NCAA, for whom the states are responsible. This state
affiliation is what separates this case from the public defender case.9'
The public defender acted pursuant to rules of the American Bar Associ-
ation, which is not affiliated with any state.
92
Furthermore, Arlosoroff's deprivation could be considered to have
been caused "by the exercise of some ... privilege created by the State."
The states gave their colleges and universities the privilege of joining the
NCAA. After so doing, the institutions voted in rules, one of which
caused Arlosoroff's deprivation. Hence, a state created privilege ulti-
mately led to the deprivation. Either way, the NCAA also satisfied the
second part of the test, so its acts would be considered state action pursu-
ant to the Lugar Court's analysis.
Finally, if the court were still to find no state action by the more
traditional means, it could have applied some completely different stan-
dard which recognized that the NCAA is a unique organization. There
is no individual state involved to create a question of "state action";
rather, the involvement is by a group of states acting in concert.9 3 This
could be a crucial distinction. In all other cases involving conversion of a
private entity's conduct into state action, the private entity did its busi-
ness entirely within one state. Thus, the home state's laws controlled its
actions, and there was one state to interject itself into the private entity's
89. See supra notes 74-77 and accompanying text.
90. Lugar, 457 U.S. at 937.
91. Polk County v. Dodson, 454 U.S. 312 (1981).
92. See supra note 61 and accompanying text.
93. The Arlosoroff court only assumed for purposes of its discussion that the traditional
state action concept applied to states acting in concert, commenting that there was no proof of
concerted action in the facts before them. 746 F.2d at 1021 n.4. Nowhere did they consider
the possibility that some alternate standard could apply.
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business.94 For the NCAA, on the other hand, there can be no true
"home state," because it does business across the nation.95 Conse-
quently, no single state can dictate the NCAA's acts sufficiently to create
state action under the court's traditional formulation of the rule.
A different standard should apply for the states acting in concert,
such as the NCAA, to ensure the Fourteenth Amendment guarantees are
not denied to the student-athlete. After all, state schools have been held
to be state actors in the past and "it would be strange doctrine indeed to
hold that the states could avoid the restrictions placed upon them by the
Constitution by banding together to form or to support a 'private' organi-
zation to which they have relinquished some portion of their governmen-
tal power." 96 In this instance, a "national action" test could be created
so that an entity would be subject to Fourteenth Amendment guarantees
when states band together to perform some portion of the states' func-
tions. The NCAA would be subject to this test because this is exactly
how the NCAA was formed. Such a test would ensure that the students
will be provided with the individual guarantees which they would be de-
prived of by the Arlosoroff decision.
Therefore, the appellate court in Arlosoroff distinguished the earlier
cases too readily and failed to create an appropriate test to meet the
unique facts of this case. It thus reached the wrong conclusion on state
action and, consequently, failed to reach the merits of the rule involved
in the case.97 This decision leaves the NCAA with substantial practical
control over the lives of thousands of young students without placing
constitutional limits on its authority. This plenary power, with no op-
portunity for judicial redress, has already caused one student-athlete to
characterize the NCAA as the "National Communists Against Ath-
94. See, e.g., Lugar, 457 U.S. 922 (Virginia state officials were used to attach property) and
Burton, 365 U.S. 715 (Delaware parking authority acted with private entity to discriminate).
95. Though its corporate headquarters are in Mission, Kansas, the NCAA has member
institutions all across the nation. McCallum, In the Kingdom of the Solitary Man, SPORTS
ILLUSTRATED, Oct. 6, 1986, at 66.
96. Parish, 506 F.2d at 1033.
97. The predecessor to NCAA Bylaw 5-1-(d)-(3) was invalidated in Howard Univ., 510
F.2d at 222. It read in part:
The "Foreign-Student" Rule. Any participant in a National Collegiate Athletic
Association event must meet all of the following requirements for eligibility ....
Participation as an individual or as a representative of any team whatever in a
foreign country by an alien student-athlete in each twelve-month period after his
nineteenth birthday and prior to his matriculation at a member institution shall
count as one year of varsity competition.
The rule was found unconstitutional for its violation of equal protection by discriminating
against foreign students. Id. Although now facially neutral, the rule may still operate to dis-
criminate against foreign students.
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letes."9  After the Arlosoroff decision, perhaps his statement was not too
far-fetched.
Jason Michael Pemstein
98. THE SPORTING NEWS, Jan. 12, 1987, at 14, col. 1.

